Abstract -This paper examines the challenges posed by domestic judicial mechanisms to address the liability of natural resources companies for human rights abuses and environmentally harmful activities, through the foreign operations of their subsidiaries.
A. INTRODUCTION
The primary function of human rights norms, as envisaged in the post war period, was to protect individuals against abuse by their own, or sometimes by other, state entities. That said, it has become clear that many important threats to the rights of individuals come not only from states but also from non-state actors, including international corporations.
While there are established rules to invoke the liability of states for their breach of international law obligations 1 , there is no equivalent to hold corporations liable for violating human rights norms. Despite arguments 2 that support direct liability of corporations in areas such as international criminal law, the lack of obvious international remedies for human rights abuse committed by corporations, means that corporate activities remain largely governed by national law, as are the mechanisms to hold them accountable. The lack of specific fora to bring human rights claims against corporations also means that liability for breach of international human rights norms is essentially a matter for national courts to deal with. The scale of investments by natural resources companies ('NRCs'), primarily in developing countries, combined with their role in generating revenues for host States, is significant of their economic and political influence 3 . Collusion with host governments has resulted in allegations of corporate complicity in governmental violations of basic human rights. At the same time, impact on the environment and communities surrounding their operations have made NRCs particularly prone to lawsuits as the principal perpetrator of human rights abuses. This paper evaluates the challenges posed to domestic judicial mechanisms to address corporate liability of NRCs for their alleged violation of international human rights norms.
Part B considers some conceptual difficulties underpinning the notion of corporate liability for breach of human rights norms.
Part C explores the arguments in the current Kiobel 4 case before the US Supreme Court 5 to illustrate the legal debate underpinning the question of corporate liability at national law for violation of human rights norms.
Kiobel is a case arising from claims under the Alien Tort Statute 6 ('ATS') that Royal Dutch Petroleum ('Shell') was complicit with the Nigerian government in human rights abuse, including torture, extra-judicial killings and crimes against humanity against the Ogoni people, who were opposing oil exploration in their territory during the 1990s. By the time of publication, the US Supreme Court will have determined whether the ATS, which allows lawsuits in the US for violation of international law, also creates a legal basis for suits against corporations. Part D considers the challenges to enforcement against corporations, at national level, of breaches of human rights norms. In addition, consideration is given to policy options to facilitate coordinated approach, drawing on the example of corporate criminal liability.
B. THE CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES UNDERPINNING THE NOTION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS

CATEGORIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY NRCS
This section suggests that, while it is possible to identify a consistent pattern of 'human rights-type abuses' committed by NRCs, there are conceptual difficulties in holding corporations liable for violating international human rights norms.
Despite longstanding and unresolved debate about whether corporations could be the 'subjects' of international law and which specific rights pertain to business activities, the fact that corporations have become participants in the international legal system with the capacity to bear both rights and duties has reached international consensus. However, whilst corporations may have, in theory, the ability to impact the full range of human rights, some norms appear to be at a greater risk in the operating context of NRCs, such as the right to life or fair trial (in cases where vested interests with the host government expose NRCs to increased risks of aiding and abetting local police or armed forces in containing resistance to their operations), or the right to a sound environment or collective rights to determine how natural resources should be protected.
Tar sands activities in Canada have been described as one of the world's biggest environmental disaster, turning vast carbon sinks into the largest emitters of carbon dioxide on the planet. 7 New exploration methods addressing increased global oil demand (including gas shale exploitation in the US or the granting of hydraulic fracturing licenses in the UK), together with the building of processing facilities and pipelines associated with oil development mean that oil companies are possibly more prone to negatively impacting the environment and disrupting communities surrounding their operations. The granting of exploration licenses and the negotiation of Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with host States may also result in difficult issues of consent in relation to land access and resettlement of local stakeholders. Indigenous peoples do not always welcome the investment of oil multinationals. This is despite the potential of these investments to bring economic and social opportunities. Local communities may perceive these developments as incompatible with their aspirations and traditional values. 8 The magnitude of revenues that oil projects constitute for host States also means that legal arrangements between oil corporations and host governments are often based on compromise. In the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline project, the freezing effect of the 'non-interference' provision in the Host Government Agreement (HGA) 9 between the BP consortium and the Turkish Government prevents Turkey from intervening in key areas of the project, including land rights and environment, except in extreme circumstances. The high threshold for State intervention set in the HGA might conflict with the state duty to protect fundamental human rights. 10 It is also frequent for contractual arrangements with host states to transfer responsibility for maintaining security issues to corporations. In certain circumstances, this has meant that the containment of protest by security forces has resulted in host states being accused of violating human rights norms, including unlawful detention and torture. In such instances, corporations have been sued for complicity with state organs.
NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND POLICY
INCOHERENCE
With the exception of US legislation, which provides for a civil cause of action directly associated with the violation of human rights norms under the ATS, no other legislation allows victims to obtain redress directly for violations of human rights per se. The 'human rights litigation' label is somewhat misleading, since far from dealing with violation of international norms as reflected in custom and treaties, cases against NRCs are typically concerned with providing civil remedies to the victims, whose main concern is to obtain compensation from defendant corporations for physical injury and property damage caused by negligence or foresight. The challenges faced by the Norms in imposing international law obligations on corporations have also re-emphasised the conceptual difficulty of positioning corporations in the web of international obligations, despite the cross-border nature of multinational companies' operations.
The main argument against imposing international human rights obligations on corporations is that juridical entities should not be allowed to take over the role of states to protect human rights. Where state authority is weak, it is feared that a transfer of duties to corporations to protect human rights may further erode political impetus to fulfil state obligations 17 , while the focus in establishing corporate liability is primarily on the harmful impact on individual humans, rather than the impact on the environment itself. Whether domestic law is able to transcend this anthropocentric approach to corporate liability in favour of a more eco-centric one might well depend on the ability of international law to formulate and recognize a right to a 'decent' or 'satisfactory environment'. So far, despite the reference at regional level to a "general satisfactory environment" 26 and the decision in the Onigoland case 27 to place substantive environmental obligations on states, the legal foundations of such a right in an instrument of worldwide applicability remain questionable.
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The difficulty to achieve a normative status extends, in fact, to the vast majority of 'collective' or third generation rights 29 . The reluctance to accept them as real rights is often justified by their broad formulation as objectives that the international community is seeking to pursue, or mere 32 and, in particular, in the right to self-determination. 33 In a case where the granting of mining licenses had resulted in indigenous communities being dispossessed of their land, the South African Constitutional Court found that the 'right to land' was a right of "communal ownership under indigenous law". 34 Such interpretation of indigenous rights by domestic courts also means that, although the primary responsibility to gain community consent under UNDRIP is on governments, the failure of NRCs to comply with indigenous consultation rights might expose NRCs to increased litigation. , a case where Chevron's subsidiary in Nigeria was accused of being complicit in human rights abuses when security forces contracted by Chevron fired at staff protesting against Chevron's drilling activities at an offshore platform.
C. THE CHALLENGES POSED
A remarkable feature of ATS litigation against NRCs is that corporations are sued as 'secondary' perpetrators of international crime. Most cases concern situations where corporations are accused of complicity in governmental violations of international law. Despite the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's observations in Unocal 41 that certain crimes "do not require State action when they are committed in furtherance of other crimes such as […] genocide or war crimes for ATS liability to attach", state intervention has been a consistent feature of ATS jurisprudence. The requirement of state intervention raises the issue as to whether US courts regard the ATS as an instrument to promote corporate accountability for human rights abuses or, rather, to pursue US foreign objectives in democratic terms. In the Bhopal litigation, where Union Carbide, the New York-based parent of the Indian subsidiary involved in the environmental 35 US Code (n 6). 36 tragedy, was the 'primary' perpetrator of the alleged offences, the courts refused to adjudicate the case. 42 Arguably, accepting jurisdiction would have suggested that the Indian legal system was inappropriate to deal with the dispute, which would have caused a political storm, given that India has one of the world's largest democracies. On the other hand, US courts have been happy to become involved with complicity allegations in Sudan, Nigeria or Burma.
BACKGROUND OF THE KIOBEL CASE
In a controversial opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Kiobel concluded by majority (the 'Kiobel majority') that corporations could not be sued under the ATS for violation of international law, since no corporation had "ever been subject to any form of liability (whether civil or criminal) under customary international law". 43 The fact that liability under international law was limited to natural, as opposed to juridical, persons led the court to conclude that "imposing liability on corporations for violation of customary international law [had] not attained a discernible, much less universal, acceptance among nations". 44 Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claim was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court decision, to hear the plaintiffs' appeal on 17 October 2011 is likely to have a major effect on the future of US litigation against corporations for extraterritorial human rights impacts and, more generally, on the notion of corporate liability for human rights abuses. The central question put to the Supreme Court in the plaintiffs' petition was "whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of the nations […] or if corporations may be sued in the same manner as any other private party under the ATS". 45 However, the controversy on corporate liability refocused on the issue of extraterritoriality following the hearing of 28 February 2012, when the Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs for a second hearing on "whether the ATS allows court to recognize a cause of action for violation of international law within the territory of a sovereign other than the US". While the focus on corporate complicity has so far maintained a compromise in ATS litigation against NRCs between motives of enhanced corporate accountability and wider policy issues, Kiobel is unprecedented in the way it reopens the debate on the legal basis of corporate liability claims for breach of international norms. This section aims to explore the key arguments in the Kiobel controversy. Sosa, where the Supreme Court constrained the type of violation of international law that could trigger the ATS jurisdiction.
KEY ARGUMENTS REVIEW (a) Whether corporate responsibility for breach of international norms is a domestic or international law notion
Interpreting the ATS from an historical perspective and relying on the narrow ambit of the "violations of the law of the nation" that qualified when the statute was enacted in 1789, namely piracy and infringement of the rights of ambassadors, the court in Sosa formulated a twofold test, that some have characterized as setting a "very high bar for new causes of action to surmount". 52 Firstly, the court observed that "federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal law for violations of any international law with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when the ATS was enacted". 53 Secondly, the court provided guidance to determine whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action stating, at footnote 20 of the opinion, that such determination requires a "related consideration of whether international law extends the scope of liability of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued if the perpetrator is a private actor such as a corporation or an individual".
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The Kiobel majority and subsequent briefs in support of the respondents rely on this "related consideration", first to justify the broad principle that corporate liability under the ATS derives from international law, then to assess whether customary international law has recognised liability for corporation for the alleged violation of the specific norms in question.
The approach of the Kiobel majority is remarkable from various perspectives: firstly, the justification of such a decisive principle is focused on a footnote of a prior Supreme Court opinion that dealt with the liability of natural as opposed to juridical persons. More importantly, the judiciary showed its determination to make a pronouncement on an ongoing and unresolved legal debate about which human rights norms apply to corporations and on what basis. In assessing whether torture or genocide by private actors violate international law, the Kiobel majority took the "related consideration" in Sosa a step further, by no longer distinguishing perpetrators between state and non-state actors but, instead, between corporations and natural persons, concluding that no sufficient consensus exists in international law that the alleged offenses (i.e. torture and genocide) can be committed directly by corporations.
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(ii) The sources considered by the respondents in applying the Sosa test.
Various sources are used to assess whether corporate liability for violation of international human rights has reached the status of customary international law.
Reference is made to the international human rights instruments such as the Convention Against Torture ('CAT'), which is interpreted as contemplating only liability of individuals 56 . Scheffer, in contrast, discounts the exclusion of corporations from the court's jurisdiction as resulting from the concern of complementarity, the fact that ICC jurisdiction should mirror that of domestic tribunals, since the ICC was created as a fallback option, and, finally, the fact that, at the time of enacting the Rome Statute in 1998, many nations had not acknowledged corporate criminal liability.
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In Kiobel, the distinction made in the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals between individuals and corporations plays a central role to assess corporate liability as a norm of customary international law. It is clear that there is a subtle connection between the two notions, but one might wonder to what extent the fact that corporations cannot be held liable under the ICC means that the underlying norm (i.e. genocide or crime against humanity) does not apply to these entities. While the limitations imposed on international criminal tribunals to prosecute natural rather than legal persons highlights the highly controversial debate about introducing criminal liability for corporations, it might be stretching the reasoning slightly too far to conclude that legal persons are immune from liability at national law for violating the norms in question.
(c) Whether the exercise of universal jurisdiction in civil matters is conform with international law
The extraterritoriality controversy in Kiobel illustrates the legal debate over when the protection of human rights justifies extraterritoriality. The briefs in support of the plaintiffs largely embrace the principle of universal jurisdiction, on the basis that federal courts should exercise jurisdiction over private actors who have allegedly committed serious human rights abuses, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or whether the harm occurred in or outside the US. The debate however, demonstrates how unclear it is whether the principle actually extends to juridical persons. The case is also representative of the tension between the classical international law tenet of non-intervention in other states' internal affairs and the values generally promoted by the entire human rights regime. A central controversy in Kiobel relates to the "exercise of universal civil jurisdiction over alleged extraterritorial abuses to which the nation has no connection". 61 After all, Kiobel concerns a claim by Nigerian citizens alleging that Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo-Dutch multinational headquartered in The Hague aided and abetted human rights violations committed by the Abacha government in Nigeria. It is correct that the ATS constitutes a unique way of enforcing international law with no equivalent outside the US, which also explains why so many lawsuits have been brought against energy companies in the US for breach of human rights norms.
(i) Extraterritoriality and international law
The broad extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised under the ATS is described as an oddity "contrary to international law". 62 Reference is made to the 64 Shell's supporters regard universal jurisdiction as contrary to the international law principle of prescriptive jurisdiction, by which "any restriction of a nation's jurisdiction from external sources would imply a diminution of its sovereignty". 65 The imposition of civil liability is also regarded as an "intrusion" on State sovereignty by the Obama administration, which filed a supplemental amicus briefin partial support of Shell, calling for significant restrictions on the application of the ATS. 66 The arguments of the US government are tied to the factual circumstances of Kiobel, but also stress the risks of international frictions, where allegations of breach of human rights involve sovereign states. The US administration observes: "although the petitioners' suit is against private corporations, adjudication of the suit would necessarily entail a determination about whether the Nigerian government has transgressed limits imposed by international law". 67 Likewise, the BP brief warns against the potential for ATS suits to constitute an "unlawful infringement" 68 of sovereignty. Holding Shell liable for aiding and abetting acts allegedly committed by the Nigerian government within Nigeria is thus seen as a indirect way to litigate the conduct of a foreign government that would otherwise be immune from direct suit under broader principles of state immunity.
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While the US supplemental brief has attracted criticism among supporters of human rights accountability 70 , blaming Western governments for resisting accusations of human rights violations, one should recall that the foreign policy concerns put forward by the US government are based on broader public and constitutional principles, which limit the authority of the judiciary to assess conflicting policy matters implicated by lawsuits. The BP brief touches on such constitutional issues, raising awareness of the 63 "problem of expanding the scope of ATS liability turning federal courts into international civil courts to remedy wrong committed elsewhere".
(ii) Extraterritoriality and statutory interpretation
In the end, whether the ATS applies to extraterritorial conduct outside the US becomes a pure exercise of statutory interpretation since the ATS is silent on the matter. A narrow interpretation consists in examining the original purpose of Congress when the statute was enacted. At that time, the objective was "to ease diplomatic frictions caused by the inadequacy of State law remedies" 72 by providing "redress for violations of international law that threatened serious consequences in international affairs of the US". 73 The ATS was after all enacted to provide remedies for torts committed against aliens on US soil or on the high seas, which are by essence outside territorial jurisdiction. This interpretation of the ATS is illustrated in the BP brief, which examines the wording of the statute, concluding that nothing in the terms 'alien' or 'violation of the law of the nations', suggests that Nigerian citizens can seek relief in US court for harm committed in Nigeria.
The debate on extraterritorial application of the ATS is endless. In Sarei v Rio Tinto
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, a case involving a similar pattern of claims to the one in Kiobel, with Papua New Guineans suing a British-Australian mining company for wrongs committed in Papua New Guinea, the Ninth Circuit's court held instead that the ATS applied to torts that occurred in foreign nations even if the alleged tort was committed by a corporation with no connection to the US. However, Judge Kleinfeld, in a dissent from the court's order, suggested that "the point of the ATS was to keep the US out of international disputes, not to inject the US into them" 75 , concluding: "I suspect that we lack jurisdiction because both the case involves a political question and because we lack subject matter jurisdiction on account of extraterritoriality". There is also a political dimension in the attempt by some governments to undermine the extraterritorial application of the ATS. 77 Scholars have suggested that the involvement of the coalition of Australian Prime Minister Howard "in the Bush Administration campaign to restrict jurisdiction of the ATS" was related to the government's "general opposition to the linking of trade and investment with human rights". 78 To date, Australia has not filed a brief to challenge jurisdiction in Kiobel, but one should not discount political factors influencing those who oppose the extraterritorial effects of national law in human rights litigation. The filing of briefs in support of the respondent by countries with substantial investments in oil and gas exploration worldwide, such as the UK and the Netherlands, is no coincidence. Not only would extended principles of extraterritoriality put their national industry at risk of increased litigation for human rights abuses, but they would also raise issues regarding the role of these countries in narrowing the governance gaps in countries endowed with huge oil and gas reserves.
(d) Whether corporations may be found liable for violation of customary international law under aiding and abetting theory of liability and, if so, which test of complicity should apply
Shell and its supporters finally dispute a long-standing assumption under the ATS litigation, namely, whether aiding and abetting constitutes a proper theory of liability. 79 It is argued that federal law should not recognize a private right of action for aiding and abetting a foreign state's violation of human right norms. By acknowledging such a cause of action, it is feared that courts adjudicating in alleged human rights abuses by private actors might indirectly create diplomatic tensions and interfere with foreign states' domestic affairs. The controversy then focuses on which standard of proof should apply to establish aiding and abetting liability. Shell elaborates on the high standard of the Second Circuit's earlier decision in Talisman, which held that corporations could only be found liable under aiding and abetting theory if they provided 'substantial assistance' to the primary perpetrator with the 'intent' (rather than mere 'knowledge') of furthering the human right violation in question.
An interesting feature of the Kiobel debate concerning whether 'knowledge' rather than 'intent' should apply to accessory corporate liability is where, and on what grounds, the parties chose to locate the legal source for establishing such standard. The fundamental divide is between sourcing the liability standard in international law 80 facilitating the commission of such crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission…", in order to infer the applicable liability standard as being one of 'intent' rather than 'knowledge'. The purpose of this paper is not to provide an answer to such divisive debate about sourcing the norms of conduct applicable to the ATS, or the liability standard applicable to corporation that allegedly violates human rights norms, or the range of available remedies, but rather to highlight the level of complexity supporting the respective parties' views. Scheffer, who headed the US delegation in the negotiation of the Rome Statute, disputes the fact that Article 25(3)(c) reflects customary international law. He points instead to the very circumstances of the Rome Statute negotiations to recall that Article 25(3)(c) was the result of "a negotiated compromise" 81 between common law and civil law governments after years of protracted negotiations. Observing that the wording of Article 25(3)(c) was "uniquely crafted for the ICC", he concludes that only ICC judges are entitled to interpret the meaning of the 'purpose' requirement under Article 25(3)(c).
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In the meantime, and in order to determine the standard for aiding and abetting liability under the ATS, Scheffer suggests drawing upon the jurisprudence of international tribunals. In cases against the Former Yugoslav Republic and Rwanda, it was established that 'knowledge' was the 80 Brief for Respondents (n 47), 52. 81 Scheffer and Kaeb (n 52) 348. 82 Scheffer and Kaeb (n 52) 352.
only standard to prosecute individuals for aiding and abetting the commission of atrocities. 83 Other scholars, like Eser, have instead favoured a narrower interpretation of Article 25(3)(c), which requires an 'intention' on the part of the aider and abettor to join the commission of the crime in question.
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From a more pragmatic perspective, one might also argue that in the context of oil multinationals, which often operate in joint ventures with host governments, an 'intention'-based standard might ensure that their subsidiaries do not face claims solely on the basis of incidental contacts with government officials accused of violating human rights norms.
One problematic issue illustrated in Kiobel (and earlier ATS cases like Unocal, in which the court found that "the standard for aiding and abetting under the ATS" was knowledge) is the extent to which the tests establishing accomplice corporate liability are consistently derived either from the ICC Statute or the jurisprudence of other international criminal tribunals. In other words, the ATS jurisprudence including Kiobel seems to rely exclusively on the use of international criminal law to establish the parameters of corporate civil liability.
However, human rights abuses by NRCs do not necessarily require resorting to criminal remedies. Abuses arising from environmental incidents caused by oil spillage for instance, concern primarily the violation of socalled 'environmental rights'. Environmental law scholars have observed that Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration or international instruments such as the World Charter for Nature, provide some "justification for using criminal responsibility as a means of enforcing international environmental law".
85 However, it is also possible to resort to other legal bases for establishing corporate liability. For example, negligence standards may provide such opportunities in an environmental context. Likewise, principles of agency liability 86 are particularly relevant in oil exploration contexts, in which oil corporations contracting with rig drilling companies are in a position to influence operations that may lead to human rights violations. Whether the Supreme Court strikes down or severely limits the application of the ATS, the controversy in this case is significant of the limits facing US courts in adjudicating alleged corporate breach of international standards. While at the time it was enacted the ATS represented a "commitment to enforce the law of the nations" 87 , it seems that the statute has lost part of the reach required to capture the complexity of energy multinational operations worldwide and the diverse scope of their human rights footprint. The potential implications of a complete rejection of corporate liability under the statute raise wider issues than the extent to which international norms apply to corporations. Kiobel concerns accountability and whether it is possible to argue that, although corporations do not necessarily have obligations under international law, mechanisms under national law should be engaged to hold them accountable for wrongdoings arising from breach of international norms.
THE LESSONS
Regardless of whether the ATS is viewed as a "mechanism to enforce international law" or a mere "peculiarity" 88 of the US legal system, Kiobel raises critical questions about the role of domestic legal regimes in enforcing human rights norms. If corporate liability is only a question of substantive international law obligations, as the Kiobel majority suggests, there is a risk that a gap in corporate accountability will arise. As Justice Kaganobserved, various international conventions "prohibit certain acts but do not talk about the actors". 89 In such instances, where international law does not specify whether the norm in question can be violated by juridical entities, relying purely on international law might be problematic, at least from an accountability perspective. While the Kiobel majority opposes the empowerment of domestic courts to impose liability for violation of international law as a matter of principle, this paper argues that even if some consensus was reached on this matter, the real challenge is the formulation of a coordinated approach to enforcement at national level.
D. THE CHALLENGES OF ENFORCEMENT IN HOLDING CORPORATIONS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
87 Sosa (n 51) 22. 88 
JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES (a) The enforcement framework suggested by the "Guiding Principles"
Not long before the UN Human Rights Council's endorsement of the Guiding Principles, the SRSG observed that "all national systems need to adopt a principled approach to the question of adjudicative extraterritorial jurisdiction, balancing the interests of claimant, defendant and States".
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This statement constitutes a strong encouragement for States in which many corporations are domiciled, to develop effective regulatory systems to address corporate liability for violation of international norms.
The Guiding Principles, per se, also provide strong support for the need for access to effective remedies by victims of human rights abuses. Guiding Principle 25 in particular requires states, "as part of their duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse [to] take appropriate steps to ensure…that when such abuses occur…those affected have access to effective remedy".
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Whilst the Guiding Principles are not binding international law, there is some consensus that they are likely to influence national law and policy and inform domestic legal standards in jurisdictions around the world.
(b) The European Union approach to jurisdiction
The Brussels I Regulation 93 confers on courts of EU Member States the competence to adjudicate civil cases against corporations domiciled within the EU regardless of their nationality, of the place where the alleged harm occurred and of the nationality of the plaintiff. 94 Domiciliation is defined by reference to the corporation's "statutory seat" or "principal place of business". 95 The Regulation has been praised for its certainty 96 . obligation is further qualified by the "nature of the right" and "the nature of the duty imposed by the right", unlike other countries where the application of the norms is not specified, the South African Constitution provides a secure ground for corporate liability for breach of human rights norms. Although some countries have passed legislation to affirm rights that are relevant in the debate on corporate liability (e.g. recent Peruvian law that guarantees indigenous peoples rights to free prior and informed consent to projects affecting their land 111 ), it is not clear whether the South African model constitution, in clarifying who bears human rights obligations, has been adopted elsewhere.
(c) Determining liability principles
There is a deeply entrenched doctrine in corporate law that a corporation's subsidiary is a body distinct from its parent company. Aimed to induce shareholders to invest, the doctrine has its foundations on the principle of 'limited liability'. This principle suggests that a parent company cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary, which is a separate legal entity, subject to the laws of the host country ('corporate veil'). In the Shell Oruma case, for instance, Shell relied on the 'corporate veil' in its defense. 112 By contrast, the plaintiffs, relying on the Cape case as legal authority 113 , alleged that the Shell parent had breached its duty of care to the Nigerian farmers, since the parent had not "exercised its influence on and control over the subsidiary's environmental policy to avoid the harm". 114 So far, at least in the UK, the 'corporate veil' doctrine remains anchored in the laws and there is no sign that the legislature will question this on human rights grounds. Whether a UK-based parent company can be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary remains in the hands of the judiciary. There are limited circumstances under which the 'corporate veil' will be pierced under English law. The courts have developed a concept of duty of care, whereby a parent company may incur liability where it owes a duty of care to the claimant. 115 In the However, there are also important limitations and it is arguable that, as the current law stands, the scope for prosecution of NRCs for criminal acts, remains limited. Save for strict liability offences, proving the mental element of a crime for legal entities is required. One method of establishing the intention or recklessness of a legal entity is to use the 'identification principle', which requires attributing the intent of a crime to the 'directing mind' of the corporation (i.e. the directors or the senior management). 120 More liberal approaches require that a 'corporate culture' exists "within the body corporate" 121 in question, with 'corporate culture' being defined in broad terms as "an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct". 122 In any case, the attribution of intent is not obvious. There are also specific enforcement difficulties that make the conviction of corporations for violation of human rights norms technically impossible. For instance, under English law, while torture, genocide and crimes against humanity are criminal offences 123 , these crimes are only subject to custodial punishment. 124 Since corporations cannot be found liable for offences punishable by imprisonment 125 , it follows that corporations cannot be convicted for violation of these specific human rights norms.
Unsurprisingly, the Trafigura case did not result in any corporate criminal prosecution in the UK Courts. Instead, Ivorian plaintiffs brought a civil suit in the London High Court seeking compensation for the physical harm and property damages caused by the 'Probo Koala' incident. Criminal liability was only established for a limited number of individuals involved with the incident. Whilst the 'Probo Koala' captain and the Trafigura officer responsible for the discharge of the slops received suspended prison sentences, respectively of five and six months in Dutch courts 126 , the most serious sentence -20-year imprisonment -was imposed by an Abidjan court on the owner of the company contracted for the disposal of the waste. Ironically, Trafigura's main shareholder and founder remained insulated from criminal prosecution for leading the export of the waste to the Ivory Coast.
(b) Ecocide and the question of individual criminal liability
The Trafigura case demonstrates the limitations of the current criminal legal regime to hold corporations accountable for violating human rights norms. The incorporation through domestic law of international crimes has so far been concentrated on the four "crimes against peace", namely Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes and Crimes of Aggression. 127 At the international level, recent proposals to introduce 'ecocide' as a fifth crime against peace to address large scale destructions of ecosystems, including corporate activities associated with the depletion of natural resources, might be a way forward. 128 The principle of complementarity under the Rome
Statute would, in turn, exercise pressure on States to implement ecocide as a crime at national level. This possibility was ventilated in the mock ecocide trial held in London in September 2011. 129 However, the effectiveness of ecocide will depend on domestic enforcement. Corporations are fictional entities with decisions made by directors and senior management. If the purpose of corporate liability is to deter corporations from violating international norms, it is suggested that these individuals should be held liable individually. Whether liability should be directed at corporations or individuals raises the difficult question of responsibility allocation. The approach of the Australian Criminal Code, which relies on 'corporate culture', can be praised for its flexibility but, at the same time, the Nuremberg tribunals (arguably at the very heart of crimes against humanity) demonstrated that 'systems', only constitute the means by which individuals engage in criminal activities and therefore cannot provide the sole reason for attributing responsibility. justifies corporate impunity is another question. A complete rejection of corporate liability based on the indeterminacy of international standards defies common sense. The incorporation of charges for international crimes into domestic law following the ratification of the Rome Statute demonstrates the capacity of national legal systems to hold corporations accountable. However, relying on domestic law to determine the pathways for corporate accountability is not without challenge.
E. CONCLUSION
Public consensus is pushing for more international supervision in standard setting. Proposals range from international conventions on safety standards for oil platforms 130 to treaties embracing broader corporate human rights obligations. 131 Such conventions are believed to help host governments resist the pressure of the oil industry to reduce regulatory supervision. These proposals however, overlook two problems. First, home states are not necessarily willing to expand principles of corporate accountability, as is evidenced by the current opposition of the US government in Kiobel to extend jurisdiction for corporate harms committed outside the US, or the caution of the Canadian Parliament to enact Bill C-354. Secondly, host states can be torn between the steps required to "strengthen domestic social and environmental standards" 132 and to "ensure the effectiveness of judicial mechanisms" 133 on the one hand, and the threat of arbitration for violating guarantees under BITs on the other hand. There is a significant risk faced by host states to entertain litigation against large oil companies. Effectively, the host state may find itself conflicted between its duty to grant access to domestic judicial mechanisms and the risk that the oil company will later invoke the violation of a BIT between the host state and the state of the investor, arguing that the course of justice has been perverted in the domestic courts. The arbitration faced by Ecuador for allegedly failing to provide due process, whilst an Ecuadorian court issued a multi-billion verdict demanding Chevron in February 2011, to fund environmental remediation for oil pollution, is an example of this sort of conflict.
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Growing concern regarding corporate impunity might generate further reform: mechanisms could be introduced into BITs to correct the "imbalance between investors' rights and the State duty to protect human rights" 135 , ecocide might be adopted as a fifth crime against peace to address environmental degradation caused by NRCs, requirements for piercing the 'corporate veil' could be harmonized across jurisdictions. However, reform is a complex and multi-faceted process. While the Human Rights Council has been urged to "establish a robust follow-on mechanism to build on the SRSG efforts" 136 , success might ultimately depend on the willingness of national legal systems to promote accountability mechanisms as a policy option.
